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In the study of genocide and other forms of mass atrocity there is a widespread sense 
that ideology matters. “Few scholars,” observes Benjamin Valentino, “have failed to 
comment on the central role that ideology has played in some of the twentieth century’s 
bloodiest mass killings.”1 In a recent theoretical survey, Scott Straus identifies ideology as 
one of the two most important factors (alongside armed conflict) emphasised in 
contemporary explanations of mass political violence,2 and a wide range of atrocity-
theorists have certainly given ideology, or related phenomena like ‘worldviews’ or ‘myths’, 
a central role in their work.3  Such perspectives have been echoed in the policy-world, 
with intergovernmental and nongovernmental organisations also making frequent 
reference to the role of ideological phenomena.4  
But despite these sentiments, all is not well with efforts to theorise the role 
ideology plays in mass atrocities. Core concepts have typically been defined vaguely, if at 
all, and it is not clear that leading theorists actually share a common understanding of 
what ideology means, let alone how it relates to other closely implicated phenomena. 
Scholars have sometimes assumed that a focus on ideology must involve an emphasis of 
case-specific ideologies,5 and as a result, comparative accounts of the common ideological 
foundations of mass violence remain limited. Even those that do exist have been uneven 
in their theoretical coverage. There is abundant cross-case research on dehumanisation 
and hate speech,6 for example, but other violence-promoting ideological factors have 
been postulated in a rather scattergun fashion. ‘Nationalist myths’, ‘narratives’, ‘hate 
propaganda’, ‘identities’, ‘purity’, ‘racism’, ‘revolutionary visions’, ‘scapegoating’, 
‘militarism’, ‘moral exclusion’, ‘utopias’ – all of these elements and more have been 
suggested as potential pieces of the ideological jigsaw surrounding atrocities. But theorists 
have produced few holistic accounts of how these different pieces fit together. So whilst 
the present literature contains many points of deep insight, we still lack a shared 
conceptual and theoretical framework for thinking about ideology’s role in mass 
atrocities. This undercuts the value of what we do know, undermining theorists’ efforts 
to pool research gains and resolve analytical disagreements. But it also obscures what we 
do not know. Without some attempt to build holistic pictures of ideology’s role in 
atrocities, we are less likely to spot areas where investigation has been relatively shallow. 
It has rarely been noticed, for instance, that whilst theorists have commented extensively 
on the ways ideologies depict victims so as to justify violence (portraying them as 
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inhuman, dangerous, or guilty, for example), they have given far less consideration to 
ideological representations of perpetrators.7  
Such problems have been exacerbated by an underlying failing. Despite their 
frequent affirmations of ideology’s importance, genocide and atrocity scholars have 
generally failed to engage with the specialist academic literature on ideology, ideas, and 
related phenomena.8 Leading ideological theorists of recent decades – such as Michael 
Freeden, Teun van Dijk, Quentin Skinner, John Jost, Raymond Boudon or John 
Thompson – make almost no appearance in texts on atrocities.9 This is understandable 
up to a point. ‘Ideology-studies’ is a fragmented field, and theorists of atrocities cannot 
be masters of everything. But the general failure to ground their discussions of ideology 
in the topic’s established literature is problematic, and leaves atrocity-theorists bereft of 
relevant methodological, theoretical, and empirical research. 
This article aims to address these problems and encourage theorists of atrocity to 
think about ideology more effectively. I do this by discussing four key questions: 
 
1. What do we mean by ideology? 
2. Who, in cases of atrocity, might be relevantly affected by ideology? 
3. How do these people come to be influenced by atrocity-justifying ideologies? 
4. How might ideology encourage these people to commit, or permit, mass violence? 
 
At present, atrocity-theorists’ answers to these four questions tend to take the form of 
unspoken and sometimes dubious assumptions. A more explicit and systematic 
consideration is needed. My aims here are theoretical and preliminary: I am primarily 
interested in offering a better framework for analysing ideology’s role in atrocities, not a 
complete and empirically substantiated theory (though I do offer some substantive claims 
which gesture at what such a theory might look like). Throughout, I shall use the term 
‘atrocities’ broadly, to denote all non-accidental acts of large scale violence against 
civilians, including but not limited to genocide.10  
I acknowledge that the critical picture I have painted is a little too sweeping. Three 
theorists – Eric Weitz, Ben Kiernan, and Alex Bellamy – have produced important 
studies of the role of ideology across cases, and comparative observations can also be 
found in the work of Jacques Semelin, Michael Mann, James Waller, Donald Dutton, and 
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several others.11 More broadly, a sophisticated literature influenced by anthropology and 
cultural analysis has produced compelling studies of phenomena which I would term 
ideological.12 I am indebted to all this work – and much of my discussion attempts to 
reorganise and integrate the insights of existing theorists rather than revise them or offer 
completely novel claims. Nevertheless, these exceptions remain too few and too partial: 
they still lack engagement with theorists of ideology, and their identification of ideological 
factors remains narrow and theoretically underdeveloped. Research on atrocities has 
therefore still, in my view, failed to get to grips with ideology. 
 
Question 1: What do we mean by ‘ideology’? 
 
Ideology is famous for its “semantic promiscuity”13 – described by one prominent 
theorist as “the most elusive concept in the whole of social science”.14 Nevertheless, in 
recent decades theorists of ideology have made real progress in thinking about how the 
concept can most usefully be used. Two impressive and influential definitional 
investigations by Malcolm Hamilton15 and John Gerring16 have systematically examined 
the many criteria that have been explicitly or implicitly attached to ideology, and exposed 
the vast majority of them as analytically unhelpful. Their conclusions are supplemented 
by the conceptual and methodological work of others, including Aletta Norval, Kathleen 
Knight, Michael Freeden and Teun van Dijk.17 Whilst disagreement certainly remains on 
how ideology ought to be defined, these theorists have converged on certain conclusions, 
and produced an established literature which can guide definitional efforts.  
 Unfortunately, atrocity-theorists have not looked to this literature for guidance in 
their use of the concept of ideology. Usually theorists either do not define how they are 
using ideology at all,18 or specify an idiosyncratic definition, seemingly of their own 
invention, with little attempt to explain or justify it.19 Even then, it often becomes clear 
that authors’ actual understandings of ideology are bedraggled with various implicit 
connotations not specified in their criteria. Some studies, such as those by Barbara Harff, 
James Waller, or the Genocide Prevention Task Force, also attach ideology to other 
descriptors (‘exclusionary’ ideology or ‘extraordinary’ ideology) without complete clarity 
on what these delimit.20 The use of ideology in research on atrocities thus retains that 
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“theoretical clumsiness” which Clifford Geertz identified in the social sciences more 
generally back in 1964.21  
Unsurprisingly, this creates problems, which include but go beyond the classic 
difficulty of theorists talking at cross purposes. There has been a common tendency, for 
example, to construct typologies where ‘ideological’ killers, motives or atrocities are hived 
off from notionally non-ideological types which, from the perspective of contemporary 
ideology-studies, actually look deeply bound up with ideology. There may well, for 
example, be some distinction between what Michael Mann calls “ideological”, “bigoted”, 
“disciplined”, “comradely”, and “bureaucratic” killers. But the use of ‘ideological’ only to 
describe the first category implies that it has little role to play in the others, which most 
theorists of ideology would dispute.22 The same could be said of Harff’s contradistinction 
of “ideological” and “retributive” genocides, or Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn’s 
separation of genocides which “implement…an ideology” from those which “eliminate a 
real or potential threat…spread terror among real or potential enemies… [or] acquire 
economic wealth”.23 Retribution, elimination/terrorisation of threats and enemies, and 
the pursuit of economic wealth can all be deeply ideological activities. The United States’ 
massacres of Native Americans, Belgium’s murderous exploitation of the Congo, and 
Germany’s annihilation of the Herero were, for example, variously motivated by 
economic interests and the perceived need to repress or punish dangerous ‘rebels’. But 
they were also, as Alex Bellamy points out, inextricably bound up with European 
colonialist ideology.24 Such typologies encourage a problematically compartmentalised 
view of ideology’s potential relevance, and rest on narrow, unspoken, and contestable 
assumptions about what the concept denotes.  
To rectify such conceptual problems, atrocities-theorists need to engage more 
seriously with the specialist contemporary literature on ideology, regarding two points in 
particular. First, atrocity-theorists should heed the increasing agreement amongst 
ideological analysts that a broad definition of ideology is the most analytically productive 
one.  In this paper I use the following definition: an ideology is a distinctive system of normative, 
semantic and/or reputedly factual ideas, typically shared by members of groups or societies, which 
underpins their understandings of their political world and shapes their political behaviour.25 These are 
scalar rather than binary criteria. Things may be more or less ideological the more 
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distinctive and systematised they are, and less ideological (without being entirely un-
ideological) when more mundane and disorganised. 
Some have worried that a broad definition like this is in danger of encompassing 
so much that it cannot be of practical use.26 I do not think so. It is a mistake to think that 
the utility of concepts is proportionate to their narrowness. Plenty of ubiquitous social 
science concepts (consider ‘psychology’ or ‘culture’) are far broader than even the most 
encompassing definitions of ideology. But they continue to be useful because their 
purpose is not to attach thick tranches of evaluative conclusions onto their referents, but 
to denote broad categories of forces, factors and phenomena. This is the best way, I 
suggest, to talk about ideology. It minimises the prejudicial evaluation of belief-systems 
by the categories we use to refer to them. It also encourages different sorts of belief-
system to be analysed in tandem, rather than drawing firm but rather arbitrary lines 
between certain familiar (and therefore supposedly ‘unideological’) political desires – such 
as acquiring national wealth or eliminating certain threats – from notionally radical or 
extremist ones like redistributing property or swearing loyalty to a national leader. And as 
academics are never going to all agree on a single highly specific conception of ideology, 
a broad definition is also the most feasible way to avoid conceptual confusion.27 Nor 
does it really involve any costs – we can always specify narrower subtypes of ideology. 
For most contemporary ideological analysts, therefore, ideologies need not be wrong, 
oppressive, dogmatic, fanatical, opposed to self-interest, in service of self-interest, 
fantastical or irrational. These are all connotations that lurk in the background of many 
uses of ideology, but are all best left for empirical determination, not definitional pre-
judgement.  
However, a fleshed-out understanding of ideology is not derived solely from 
definitional criteria. A second crucial feature of contemporary ideological analysts’ use of 
the concept is their depiction of ideologies as rich and multifaceted phenomena.28 They 
are not presented as just a handful of core principles or beliefs, but as elaborate and 
bourgeoning cultural edifices – historically sculpted networks of values, meanings, 
narratives, assumptions, concepts, expectations, exemplars, past experiences, images, 
stereotypes, and beliefs about matters of fact. Only by taking this complexity of atrocity-
justifying ideologies seriously can we hope to understand how perpetrators of mass 
violence come to believe in them. One cannot, for example, fathom the relevance of 
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Nazism to the Holocaust simply by talking of ferocious anti-Semitic hatred. One has to 
get to grips with the idealised representation of military life and ethnic community 
embedded in the legacy of the World War I kampfgemeinschaft, the long legacy of Christian 
anti-Semitism in Central Europe, the centrality of racial ‘science’ authorised by the 
German medical and academic professions, the distinctively Nazi virtue-systems of 
obedience and merciless toughness, their quasi-deterministic conceptions of historical 
time, and much more besides.29 So too with all other ideologies. Specialist analysts of 
individual atrocities often have done this – building rich and comprehensive pictures of 
the ideological backgrounds to violence.30 But these have rarely extended to the level of 
overarching theory.31   
In particular, there has been a common tendency for genocide scholars to 
associate ‘ideology’ primarily with what we might think of as its ‘attitudinal’ and 
‘normative’ components, and to ignore or background it’s more ‘descriptive’ and 
‘semantic’ components (though such components are obviously always entangled).32 
Ideologies are more than bundles of extremist values, hate-filled passions, and radical 
revolutionary ambitions. They are just as importantly comprised of basic but idiosyncratic 
descriptive beliefs about the world, and of subtle semantic framings which inject meaning 
into parts of that world.33 Atrocity-justifying ideologies label victims as dangerous threats 
or guilty criminals, assert that society is at a crisis-filled turning point, euphemistically 
reframe killing as ‘self-defence’ or ‘serving the revolution’, and enrich all of these claims 
with textured historical narratives and mythical ‘knowledge’. It is often these sorts of 
ideological elements which make violence look desirable, or at least permissible, to many 
ordinary perpetrators. I therefore worry about the emphasis many analysts and policy 
documents place on “hate ideology”, “hate speech”, “hate propaganda”, “hate 
broadcasts” or, more broadly, “normative mobilization”.34 Such phrases are apt in some 
circumstances, but it is vital to recognise that the key ideological processes which lead to 
violence are often built on frames and factual assertions as much as on passionate 
emotions or radical values. Overlooking this point can render preventive efforts to fight 
atrocities lopsided, and risks renewing a tendency to conceive of perpetrators as 
universally consumed by a burning, out-of-control hatred – a portrayal now widely 
accepted as inaccurate.  
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Question 2: Who, in cases of atrocity, might be relevantly affected by ideology? 
 
There has been a propensity, in existing scholarship on atrocities, to limit the presumed 
relevance of ideology to only certain specific sorts of actor. Some imply, for example, that 
ideologies can only influence those who are actually members of ideological 
organisations, or who receive explicit propaganda and indoctrination sessions, or who 
display manifest brutality towards their victims.35 Other theorists suggest that ideology 
generally only matters for (some members of) the public, duped into killing by the 
legitimating manipulations of self-interested leaders.36 Or the reverse, Valentino has 
influentially suggested that mass publics are largely apathetic masses induced to 
participate through conformity pressures, self-interest, and coercion – it is the leaders and 
elites who are genuinely motivated by ideologies in initiating mass violence.37 
Such portrayals are not wholly in error, but their restriction of ideology to certain 
groups often rests on the sort of conceptual confusion described above. As with the 
typologies discussed under question 1, the underlying problem is an unusually narrow 
visualisation of what ‘ideology’ might denote. If killers are not found to match 
expectations of the “raving ideologue”38 acting on the basis of “insane ideological 
commitment”,39 it is quickly inferred that they were relatively uninfluenced by ideology in 
general. Such reasoning appears, for example, to underpin ideology’s relative de-emphasis 
by, inter alia, Waller, Valentino, Scott Straus, John Mueller, Charles Tilly and Stathis 
Kalyvas.40 These theorists rightly reject depictions of atrocity perpetrators as all “caught 
up in the throes of bloodlust” or “swept up in supremacist euphoria”,41 and stress, by 
contrast, the relative “ordinariness” of killers. But an explanation which emphasises 
ideology need not deny such ordinariness.42 Ideological beliefs do not need to be held 
pathologically, with one hundred per cent conviction, with explicit and self-conscious 
emphasis, or on the basis of many years of prior commitment. And as a result, someone 
does not have to be a card-carrying member of an explicitly ideological movement for 
ideology to influence their behaviour. A perpetrator might be conflicted, lack visible 
hatred, and participate in atrocity in part for non-ideological motives. Yet they may still 
have internalised ideological beliefs about the nature of their actions, and the moral status 
of their victims, which are vital in making them able to kill. I suspect that this possibility 
has been understated in part because of the frequent association of ‘ideological 
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explanations’ with the particular approach of Daniel Goldhagen, and his claim that an 
eliminationist anti-Semitic ideology held with high conviction was the crucial and 
sufficient cause of the Holocaust.43 But whatever the merits or shortcomings of 
Goldhagen’s work, he does not represent the limits of an explanatory focus on ideology. 
Ideology cannot, therefore, be presumed to be relevant at only one part of the 
machinery of atrocity-perpetration. In terms of their causal relationship to violence, a 
loose distinction can be drawn between three main categories of perpetrators: policy-
initiators (who make the key decisions which lead to the commission of atrocities); direct 
killers (who do not issue the original orders to kill, but carry out the acts of physical 
destruction); and bystanders (who do not actively participate in killing, but possess 
potential unused power to frustrate it, making their passivity a key enabling condition). 
These categories are not completely clear cut: sometimes policy-initiators may serve as 
direct killers as well, and in relatively spontaneous acts of atrocity there may be no 
discretely identifiable policy-initiators. We might also want to talk about two further 
categories: indirect killers (staffing the bureaucracies linking policy-initiators and direct 
killers) and victims (given the ways they have occasionally been complicit in their own 
destruction, most famously in the case of the Jewish Sonderkommando in the 
Holocaust).  
 A successful account of the ideological dynamics of atrocities should explore the 
potential role of ideology for all these participant categories, and should avoid the 
temptation to treat them as homogenous blocks, with members all sharing the same 
motives and mind-sets. As many theorists emphasise, perpetrators of violence participate 
for a variety of reasons and in a range of dispositional states.44 As such, they may be 
influenced by ideological beliefs held with varying levels of commitment, conviction and 
consciousness.45 In general, for the reasons Valentino identifies, we might expect 
atrocity-justifying ideologies to be endorsed with greater conviction amongst policy-
initiators than direct or indirect killers. We might also expect ideology to play a more 
active motivational role for the former, and a more passive enabling role for the latter. 
And at least in the cases of the Nazi and Stalinist leaderships, data on the internal 
discourse of the regime can be found which supports such a presumption.46 But these are 
still broad-brushed generalisations. Actual assessments of ideology’s role should be 
attuned to complex distributions of ideological belief across members of participant 
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categories, rather than reaching binary conclusions to the effect that some groups of 
killers ‘are ideological’ whilst others ‘aren’t’. 
 
Question 3: How do these people come to be influenced by atrocity-justifying 
ideologies? 
 
In discussing how atrocity-justifying ideologies come to influence large numbers of 
people, a plea to avoid crude ‘brainwashing’ accounts, in which beliefs are channelled in a 
top-down manner from policy-initiators to passive direct-killers, is likely to meet with 
quick approval. But there is not an abundance of more sophisticated models available in 
the atrocity-studies literature – in general, the question of ideological dissemination in 
contexts of atrocity remains under-examined.47 Two subsidiary questions can be 
delineated here. First, how is ideology communicated – how does it ‘get around’? Second, 
how is ideology rendered persuasive – why do people buy-in to the discourses and 
arguments which serve to justify mass violence? 
 The first question has no definitive answer. Ideology can be communicated by 
almost any means, and dominant conduits are largely determined by contextually available 
resources and technologies. But four principal forms can be distinguished: first, everyday 
social interactions; second, long-term institutionalised practices of explicit education such 
as state schooling or institutional training programmes; third, medium-run propaganda 
programs such as sustained media campaigns, or organised public protests aimed 
‘upwards’ at leaders; and fourth, short-run calls to violence such as incitement speeches, 
SMS instructions, orders funnelled through institutional hierarchies, and escalatory radio 
and television broadcasts. Effective ideological dissemination will usually rely on multiple 
channels, and involve a combination of ‘top-down’, ‘bottom-up’ and ‘horizontal’ 
communication. This is important, as it demonstrates the error in assuming that a lack of 
explicit indoctrination in blatant political organisations indicates the weakness of 
ideological motives or beliefs.48 Such explicit indoctrination is simply not the only way 
that ideology ‘gets around’.  
 But why do audiences buy-in to atrocity-justifying ideologies? Again, existing work 
in the study of ideology and ideas provides a wealth of explanations to be plundered in 
analysing this question. I will outline only what I take to be one un-radical but 
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nevertheless central insight associated with work in social epistemology, namely that the 
vast bulk of peoples’ beliefs are formed, not through a process of personal empirical 
inference, but under conditions of “epistemic dependence”.49 As the sociologist Michael 
Baurmann puts it:  
 
“Almost all of our knowledge is acquired, not by our own 
autonomous exploration, but by relying on information from 
others… the quality of our beliefs is [dependent] on the quality of 
collective knowledge acquisition.”50 
 
People absorb prominent ideological discourse not because they are unusually gullible but 
because, like all of us, they are dependent on key ‘epistemic authorities’ (political leaders, 
intellectuals, church and community elders, news media, or simply other individuals) for 
the vast majority of their political knowledge.51 Atrocity-justifying ideologies are most 
influential when they operate through such epistemic dependence: when they can be 
founded on top of factual claims and narratives circulated by significant epistemic 
authorities who are deemed trustworthy by members of a social group.52 
This raises the question of why ordinary people, who are not mindless, psychotic, 
or already committed ideologues, deem disseminators of atrocity-justifying ideologies to 
be credible epistemic authorities. But this is not a difficult question to answer. 
Disseminators may have strong reservoirs of status and credibility in the eyes of those 
they influence, at least compared to (potentially limited) alternatives.53 Or the ideological 
beliefs they peddle may look plausible in light of the broader ideological environment of 
an audience’s specific historical context.54 Or perhaps the beliefs are simply amenable to 
the audience’s basic self-interest or psychological needs.55 Indeed, one of the most 
important strands of research in recent ideology-studies has been the analysis of such 
“motivated social cognition”: the endorsement of ideological beliefs because they satisfy 
psychological compulsions towards positive self-esteem, cognitive dissonance 
minimisation, or terror management, or otherwise provide a satisfying (rather than 
epistemologically optimal) account of reality.56 Finally, epistemic authorities may be able 
to make their claims plausible simply by saturation. Sufficiently suffuse an ideological 
environment, so that a belief becomes something ‘everybody says’, and it is liable to 
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receive wide endorsement even if never properly substantiated.57 These processes, 
though not the whole story, are all crucial explanations for the successful dissemination 
of beliefs conducive to violence (and conversely, ideological dissemination will tend to 
fail when these conditions are not satisfied).  
 
Question 4: How might ideology encourage these people to commit, or permit, 
mass violence? 
 
In a sustained analysis of the ideological dynamics of mass atrocities, this is likely to be 
the question which occupies theorists the most. Yet despite individual points of deep 
theorisation (on dehumanisation and moral exclusion,58  for example) it has generally 
been answered either incompletely or indirectly. Comparative studies have tended to 
identify broad recurring ideological ‘themes’ that surround atrocities: Weitz focuses on 
“utopias of race and nation”,59 Kiernan on “racism”, “territorial expansionism”, “cults of 
cultivation” and “purity”;60 whilst Bellamy lists three “basic pathways” for the 
justification of atrocities – “denial”, the “principle of military necessity”, and a broad 
“ideology of selective extermination”.61 These are insightful conclusions – but they 
remain causally unspecific, sometimes intentionally so.62 They trace important patterns in 
the ideological background to violence, but they leave the more causally proximate 
ideological foreground under-theorised. How, in a given ideological environment, do 
perpetrators actually come to believe that mass violence is permissible or even desirable? 
How do the background themes actually feed into the concrete decisions to initiate and 
participate in atrocities? We lack detailed answers to these questions. 
To develop them, I believe we should distinguish at least three proximate causal 
pathways. Ideology may a) generate or shape active motives that create the desire to 
commit violence; b) create legitimating perceptions or beliefs which make violence seem 
permissible prior to/during commission; and/or c) provide rationalising resources for 
retrospectively dealing with the commission or permission of violence after the fact.63 
There is no reason to assume, as some appear to,64 that a weak role along one pathway 
necessitates an equally weak role along the others. It may be the case, for example, that 
many direct-killers do not possess strong ideological motivations, yet do participate in 
part due to ideological legitimations. It is also important to avoid the easy assumption 
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that the third pathway – post-hoc rationalisation – is causally irrelevant. Atrocities, we 
must not forget, are hardly ever single isolated acts of killing, but campaigns of violence 
involving reiterative participation on the part of direct-killers. As such, successful 
rationalisation of violence may well be a key requirement for large scale atrocities to 
occur. Though often forthcoming, successful rationalisation is not guaranteed and may 
be facilitated or obstructed by ideological factors.  
We can unpack the potential role of ideology further. Ideology may serve to 
motivate, legitimate, and rationalise for a committed core of policy-initiators and/or 
direct-killers themselves, but it may also serve as a means for the committed core to 
mobilise (or demobilise) others, providing them with ideological motivations, legitimations 
or rationalisations. Such efforts will generally aim to convert the less enthusiastic into 
active participants, but ensuring that they remain passive bystanders may be enough. 
Motivations, legitimations and rationalisations may also enable and encourage violence at 
varying levels of cognitive complexity. As has been made particularly clear by the research 
of sociologist Randall Collins and military psychologist David Grossman, killing is hard.65 
But there are several reasons for this, and an important distinction can be drawn between 
deep-seated psychological resistance to killing on the one hand, and ‘higher-order’ 
normative concerns with appropriate behaviour and positive moral self-identity on the 
other.66 Ideological motivations, legitimations and rationalisations may be important in 
overcoming both of these sources of restraint.  
 Having drawn the distinction between motivation, legitimation and rationalisation, 
however, I should stress that most ideological components can serve all three pathways. 
Which pathway is more or less important will vary at the individual level, so our 
generalisations about ideology’s role may need to remain presumptively neutral between 
the three pathways. I therefore collectively refer to processes of motivation, legitimation 
and rationalisation as ideological justification. One foremost task in understanding 
ideology’s role in atrocities, then, is an identification of the recurring mechanisms by 
which ideologies justify (motivate/legitimate/rationalise) mass violence against civilians 
across different cases. 
Drawing on a review of the existing secondary literature on atrocities, combined 
with my own analysis of available primary documents from a range of cases, I suggest 
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that we can identify six such recurring justificatory mechanisms. I term these (with 
varying degrees of originality):  
 
(i) dehumanisation 
(ii) guilt-attribution 
(iii) threat-construction 
(iv) deagentification 
(v) virtuetalk 
(vi) future-bias 
 
I believe this six-fold list of justificatory mechanisms more comprehensively describes the 
ways ideologies actually feed into perpetrators’ willingness to kill than existing models. 
Importantly, it encompasses ideological representations of both victims and perpetrators. 
The first three justificatory mechanisms are primarily about victims – portraying them as 
subhuman, guilty or threatening. A central function of all three is the “moral exclusion” 
of victims from the “universe of obligations” perceived by perpetrators67 – but this is not 
the only way in which these three mechanisms serve to justify violence, nor are the means 
of moral exclusion described by each mechanism the same. The latter three justificatory 
mechanisms principally describe ideological representations of perpetrators (whether 
policy-initiators, direct killers, indirect killers, or bystanders). Nevertheless, this division 
between characterisations of victims and perpetrators is not total. For example, the 
ideological processes which depict victims as threatening and guilty also serve to frame 
perpetrators as acting in self-defence and as being, themselves, the ‘real victims’. 
Portrayals of victims and perpetrators are thus entangled.  
In the remainder of this section, I provide a brief account of these six recurring 
justificatory mechanisms. I stress that this is an illustrative model only, an example of 
what a more comprehensive account of the causally proximate ways in which ideologies 
contribute to the perpetration of atrocities might look like. Developing and substantiating 
the six-fold model in a sustained fashion is a task beyond the confines of this article. 
 
Dehumanisation 
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As analysed in an extensive literature, atrocity-justifying ideologies typically contain 
conceptions of victims which represent them as inhuman, subhuman or in other ways 
inferior to perpetrators, as documented in Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia, Rwanda, 
Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Japanese occupation of China and numerous other 
atrocities.68 “No war may be conducted humanely against nonhumans,” declared General 
von Trotha, the senior German commander during the Herero genocide.69 “We thought 
of them as things,” one Japanese general reported, regarding Chinese victims of the Rape 
of Nanking, “not people like us.”70 Such beliefs are frequently endorsed by leading 
epistemic authorities: including scientists, members of the medical professions, and 
public intellectuals. As one Nazi doctor put it: “Of course I am a doctor and I want to 
preserve life. And out of respect for human life, I would remove a gangrenous appendix 
from a diseased body. The Jew is the gangrenous appendix in the body of mankind.”71 
Such dehumanisation encourages mass violence in a number of ways: legitimating killing 
by morally excluding victims from the universe of obligations perceived by 
perpetrators;72 actively motivating violence through feelings of revulsion and the need to 
‘purify’ alien infections;73 and providing a euphemistic lexicon for sanitised 
communication about mass killing (as “cleansing”, “delousing”, “pest-control” and so 
forth) which eases legitimation and rationalisation.74 
 
Guilt-Attribution 
But dehumanisation is not the sole way to portray victims in a manner conducive to 
violence. Accusing victims of great past or present crimes has been just as prevalent a 
justificatory mechanism – generating the desire for vengeance and framing victims as 
legitimate targets of repression. As clear proof of victims’ guilt is typically unavailable, 
conditions of epistemic dependence are crucial. Rumours, unsubstantiated assertions by 
authorities, and incessant repetitions of anecdotal cases have been utilised to create a 
confident social perception of victims as guilty in cases of violence ranging from 
Cambodia, to Armenia, to racist violence in the United States.75 And in almost all large 
scale atrocities, the guilt-attribution process involves the ascription of guilt to a collective.76 
That such a perception is an established part of atrocity-justifying ideologies has been 
noted by several theorists, notably Waller, Mann, Semelin and Staub,77 and it is also 
frequently affirmed by subsequent perpetrator testimony. “I was then of the conviction 
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that the Jews were not innocent but guilty,” declared one former Nazi police battalion 
member involved in mass shootings of Jews, “I believed the propaganda that all Jews 
were criminals… and that they were the cause of Germany’s decline... The thought that 
one should disobey or evade the order to participate in the extermination of the Jews did 
not therefore enter my mind at all.”78 Similarly, Hutu killers of the Rwandan genocide 
described how “we thought all Tutsis at fault for our constant troubles… That’s how we 
reasoned and that’s how we killed at the time.”79  
 
Threat-Construction 
A striking feature of atrocities is the mismatch, in the eyes of an outside observer, 
between the objective harmlessness of victims and the perception of them as dangerous 
threats by their killers. It is the perceived threat that matters, and killers’ ideological 
worldviews are centrally characterised by their descriptive and semantic representation of 
victims as threatening.80 There is, as Martin Shaw writes, a “construction of civilian 
groups as enemies, not only in a social or political but also in a military sense, to be 
destroyed.”81 I say descriptive and semantic, because of the crucial role played by the 
recurring lexicons deployed by perpetrating organisations which presumptively assign 
victims threatening status.82 Suharto’s anticommunist policies in Indonesia, for example, 
consistently targeted “gangs of security disruptors”,83 the Nazis fought “Judeo-
Bolsheviks”84 or “International World Jewry”,85 and Stalinists targeted “socially harmful 
elements”.86 Defining the enemy is thus a crucial process of constructing them, but such 
lexicons also look appropriate because of direct factual claims expounded by powerful 
epistemic authorities – often the state security apparatus. A Rwandan army memorandum 
thus asserted a threat from “Tutsi inside or outside the country, extremist and nostalgic 
for power… who wish to reconquer power by all means necessary including arms.”87 The 
infamous Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences similarly affirmed that: 
“Except for the period of the [Croatian Ustaše state established by Nazi Germany] Serbs 
were never so endangered as they are today”.88 Such threat-construction has three central 
effects: establishing a clear motivation for killing victims, framing them as legitimate 
targets, and reframing perpetrators as legitimately acting in self-defence.89 It is also 
conducive to violence through several indirect psychological processes, increasing in-
P a g e  | 16 
 
group cohesion and identification, increasing propensities to obey authorities, increasing 
inclinations for severe punishment, and so forth.90 
 
Deagentification 
By ‘deagentification’, I refer to the ideological portrayal of killers as lacking meaningful 
agency or responsibility in causing atrocities to occur. Such deagentification is not usually 
total: perpetrators rarely claim that their individual actions lacked any agency. But the 
overall atrocity – the fact that people are dying – is typically presented by atrocity-
justifying ideologies as an ‘inevitable’ or ‘necessary’ result of certain irresistible forces or 
unavoidable conditions. Providence, the laws of class or racial struggle, technological 
progress, the nature of war, or simply the actions of others are held up as the real cause 
of atrocities, rather than the deliberate decisions made by policy-initiators, direct and 
indirect killers, and bystanders. To borrow a phrase from Eric Gordy, atrocity-justifying 
ideologies engage in the “destruction of alternatives”91: forcefully asserting that no other 
option but violence exists (a move particularly visible in justifications of atrocity in terms of 
“military necessity”).92 And for some atrocity-justifying ideologies, such claims are 
supported by elaborate quasi-deterministic conceptions of history. Nazis asserted that 
they merely wished, in Martin Bormann’s words: “to adapt our people to the laws of 
nature... the ineluctable struggle for existence. This struggle exists, whether we like it or 
not, whether we reject or accept it... Just as the individual... must assert and maintain his 
existence, so must the nation as a whole.”93 Similarly Communist and colonialist 
ideologies consistently depicted the destruction of whole groups as an unavoidable 
consequence of historical development.94 Whatever the method, such ideological 
elements occlude the role of human agency in causing the atrocity in question, shielding 
perpetrators from the perception of moral responsibility for the death and suffering 
caused. They are recurring features of the ideological discourse surrounding atrocities, 
yet, aside from scattered comments across the atrocity-studies literature, and rather more 
sustained reflections by Hannah Arendt and certain social psychologists, their role 
remains under-examined.95  
 
Virtuetalk 
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By virtuetalk, I refer to the rhetorical presentation of killing as demonstrating the 
laudable character of the perpetrator – a pervasive element of atrocity-justifying 
ideologies (despite sitting in slight superficial tension with deagentifying claims). 
Virtuetalk attempts to connect the substantive activity of killing with sedimented, 
respectable social values: duty, vigilance, hardness, courage, etc., and to denigrate moral 
qualms or resistance as indicating weakness, treasonous tendencies, or other socially 
disrespected qualities. Bolsheviks in Russia were told: 
 
“You must assume your duties with a feeling of the strictest Party 
responsibility, without whimpering, without any rotten liberalism. 
Throw your bourgeois humanitarianism out of the window and act 
like Bolsheviks worthy of Comrade Stalin. Beat down the kulak 
agent wherever he raises his head.”96 
 
The Khmer Rouge likewise recommended “seething hatred and blood rancor against 
national and class enemies,”97 whilst a Nazi police battalion manual stated that “he 
behaves correctly who, by setting aside all possible impulses of personal feeling, proceeds 
ruthlessly and mercilessly.”98 Such discourse, whilst sometimes noted, has received little 
empirical or theoretical examination from theorists of genocide.99 Yet perceptions of 
virtuous and vicious behaviour are crucial components of any ideological worldview, and 
may be psychologically vital: strengthening conformity pressures by tugging on the 
machoistic insecurities of typical perpetrators, and legitimating participation in atrocity by 
attaching it to a positive and socially lauded sense of self-identity.100 It also, like 
dehumanisation, serves to provide a euphemistic lexicon for sanitised communication 
about mass killing.101  
 
Future-Bias 
Theorists have often remarked on the ‘utopian’ quality of atrocity-justifying ideologies.102 
The most horrific campaigns of violence – such as the Holocaust, Stalinist Terror, Maoist 
Cultural Revolution or Cambodian politicide – are often conducted as part of radical 
visions of societal transformation. But the causally significant dynamic here is not, I 
believe, limited to such grandiose schemes. I talk of ‘future-bias’ to refer to a future-
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orientated moral fallacy which recurs across atrocities: the perception of known moral 
harms in the present – the deaths of victims – as outweighed by massive future goods 
which have not been discounted for their uncertainty. Atrocity-justifying ideologies frequently 
invoke a consequentialist calculus, in other words, but the calculus is loaded: no means in 
the present is sufficiently terrible as to be unjustifiable given the confident assertion of 
huge benefits multiplied into the infinite future. This creates an extraordinarily permissive 
moral logic. And because the expected future benefits have often been ideologically 
hegemonised in their historical context by powerful epistemic authorities, it often does 
not even occur to perpetrators to question the likelihood of the benefits that their actions 
are framed as being in pursuit of actually accruing. Nazi soldiers were thus confident that 
after the war “the great peace will come for which all peoples are hoping. Fighting for 
that, no sacrifice is too great.”103 “We were convinced that we were creating a 
Communist society,” one Soviet citizen later testified, “that it would be achieved by the 
Five Year Plans, and we were ready for any sacrifice.”104 More broadly, extreme or 
abusive military policies have frequently been justified in the name of speculative future 
benefits which are then fallaciously weighed up with known present harms on an equal 
footing.105 This form of consequentialist reasoning, and the broader orientation towards a 
speculative future that surrounds it, is a key recurring feature of the ideological 
justification of violent atrocities. 
 
These six justificatory mechanisms may be present in varying degrees in different cases – 
certainly they are not all required for atrocities to become viewed as justified. But all six 
have in fact been pervasive, I believe, in the twentieth century’s major cases. They are 
visible in the public and private discourse which surrounds atrocities at the time, and in 
the subsequent testimony of perpetrators (despite often running against their self-
interest).106 This provides some basis for taking them seriously, as data telling us 
something about how perpetrators actually thought.  
But I stress that these six justificatory mechanisms do not describe all the 
ideological dynamics of atrocities. Other scholars may identify further justificatory 
mechanisms that recur across cases, as well as case-specific justificatory mechanisms 
which do not recur. And there are many other ideological phenomena which less directly 
cause violence, but remain relevant, such as the background themes mentioned at the 
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beginning of this section. In particular, there are at least some other recurring ideological 
forces which we might think of as ‘intensifier mechanisms’, such as polarised group 
identities, highly antagonistic attitudes towards existing normative systems, and 
ideologically-based epistemic over-confidence. Such forces do not justify violence on 
their own – even polarised group identities need to be converted into a reason for 
violence through threat-construction, guilt-attribution, etc.107 But they broaden and 
strengthen the justificatory mechanisms, expanding the scale of the violence they can 
encourage. A full theory of the ideological dynamics of mass atrocities would need to 
account for these, just as it would also need to consider those ideological factors which 
restrain violence.108 Justifications (as motivations/legitimations/rationalisations) are, I 
have argued, the most causally proximate manner in which ideology encourages violence, 
but they are not the only ideological phenomena that matter. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Theorists have increasingly accepted that genocides and other mass atrocities occur, in 
part, because “perpetrators believe that mass killing is the right thing to do.”109 For 
outsiders, convinced that mass killing is amongst the very worst things one can do, such a 
belief is inexplicable unless we get to grips with ideology: with the distinctive worldviews 
and justifications that perpetrators operate under. This is not to imply that ideology 
provides a sufficient explanation of atrocities – it does not. Ideological factors sit 
alongside psychological, personal, institutional, situational, economic and political ones. 
But they are central in their own right, and are also entangled with these other factors, 
since few forces can shape human behaviour unmediated by the worldviews and schemas 
of meaning which ideologies provide.110 
In this paper, I have sought to offer a more systematic and comprehensive 
framework for thinking about the role of ideology across cases, and in the process tried 
to offer some illustrative outlines of what a more theoretically developed account of that 
role would look like. Bellamy rightly notes that whilst “the precise contours of 
justification shift from case to case” of atrocity, there are nevertheless useful 
generalisations we can make regarding the features of ideologies which serve to justify 
violence across cases. 111 Theorists have been doing this for some time, generating much 
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important knowledge in the process. My argument is not that that this existing work is 
hopelessly flawed, but that it has been held back by a lack of theoretical development on 
a range of vital questions. How do the many different ideological elements identified by 
theorists fit together? How are they disseminated in specific contexts of atrocity? Why do 
perpetrators buy-in to them? How are they differently internalised (or not) amongst 
different sorts of perpetrator? How might they actually encourage violence? How do they 
draw upon or constitute broader ideologies? How do they interact with other ideological 
forces which may intensify or restrain them? These questions have certainly not been 
ignored by atrocity-theorists, but they have not been considered in a systematic or 
comprehensive fashion.  
This article cannot claim to have changed all of that, since much more remains to 
be said on all the points I have raised. But I hope to have offered a better footing for 
building the sorts of theories which would systematically investigate these issues, and 
which would incorporate the latest research from both atrocity-studies and ideology-
studies. This paper has therefore aimed to start a ‘rethinking’ process which might allow 
us to advance out understanding of ideology’s role in atrocities. It certainly has not 
finished it. 
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